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INTRODUCTION 
In early 2006, when the United States began to negotiate a free-
trade agreement (FTA) with Malaysia, many Malaysians took to 
the streets to protest the commencement of the discussions.1  The 
diverse coalition of demonstrators included people living with 
HIV/AIDS, consumers, health activists and human rights groups.2  
Their concerns—that differences between a U.S. bilateral trade 
arrangement and the preexisting global intellectual property (IP) 
standards could have dangerous implications on public health—are 
shared by economists at the World Bank, NGOs, and trade 
negotiators in Geneva.3  One key apprehension regarding the FTA 
is the potential effect of the agreement’s IP provisions on the 
pharmaceutical industry.4  The IP terms5 afford greater exclusivity 
rights to originator drug companies, and prevent increased 
competition from generic manufacturers.6  With less competition, 
pharmaceutical prices may rise beyond the budgets of thousands of 
Malaysian citizens,7 many of whom are victims of the country’s 
severe AIDS and tuberculosis epidemics.8 
As of 2005, there are an estimated 69,000 people in Malaysia 
living with HIV/AIDS,9 and a UNAIDS report warns that there are 
elements that could cause Malaysia’s epidemic to erupt suddenly.10  
 
 1 Chee Yoke Heong, Malaysians Protest Against Free Trade Talks with U.S., FTA 
MALAYSIA, June 13, 2006, http://www.ftamalaysia.org/article.php?aid=66 [hereinafter 
Malaysians Protest Talks]. 
 2 Id. 
 3 Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade 
and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 317, 349 (2005) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 4 See Malaysians Protest Talks, supra note 1. 
 5 For a discussion of the IP terms that the U.S. will attempt to negotiate, see infra Parts 
I.A and I.C–D. 
 6 See infra Parts I.D–E. 
 7 See Malaysians Protest Talks, supra note 1. 
 8 See UNAIDS/WHO, AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE: DECEMBER 2006—ASIA, 
http://data.unaids.org/pub/EpiReport/2006/05-Asia_2006_EpiUpdate_eng.pdf 
 9 See id.; see also UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, SPECIAL SESSION ON 
HIV/AIDS, MONITORING THE DECLARATION OF COMMITMENT ON HIV/AIDS—COUNTRY 
REPORT: MALAYSIA 5 (2005),  http://data.unaids.org/pub/Report/2006/2006_country_ 
progress_report_malaysia_en.pdf. [hereinafter UNAIDS-REPORT]. 
 10 See UNAIDS-REPORT, supra note 9, at 1; see also S. Singh & N. Crofts, 5(3) HIV 
Infection Among Injecting Drug Users In North-East Asia, AIDS CARE 273, 273–74, 
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High risk behavior, especially intravenous drug usage, has 
contributed to the rise in incidence of HIV.11  The increase in HIV 
was especially strong among Malaysians with the lowest levels of 
income and fewest years of schooling.12  This public health 
situation, which particularly affects the most vulnerable parts of 
Malaysia’s population,13 makes the prices of life-saving 
medications a vital consideration in the country’s FTA negotiations 
with the U.S. 
In the U.S.-Malaysia trade discussions, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR) will undoubtedly push for increased levels 
of IP rights.14  These “ironclad” IP protections are accompanied 
with promises of increased foreign direct investment,15 but the 
primary inquiry must be whether the new provisions will interfere 
with Malaysia’s ability to address its public health needs.  
Acknowledging Malaysia’s unique social, economic, and industrial 
characteristics, this paper evaluates the prospective impact that a 
trade agreement with the U.S. could have on public health, paying 
particular attention to the provisions on data exclusivity as well as 
marketing approval and patent linkage requirements.  Part I of this 
note presents (A) background on the TRIPs agreement and 
regional/bilateral trade agreements, (B) the current public health 
environment in Malaysia, (C) an outline of the broad policy 
considerations of pharmaceutical exclusivity rights, and (D)–(E) 
the relevant IP protections present in the TRIPs agreement, and in 
regional and bilateral trade agreements.  Part II discusses the 
ramifications of U.S.-FTA-level IP provisions, and the positive and 
negative implications that the heightened IP regime may have on 
the pharmaceutical industry in Malaysia.  Part II.A outlines the 
benefits of a U.S.-Malaysia FTA that follows an approach closer to 
 
available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrez/query.fcgi?cmd=Retrieve&db=PubMed 
&list_uids=8218462&dopt=Abstract. 
 11 See UNAIDS-REPORT, supra note 9, at 11. 
 12 Singh & Crofts, supra note 10, at 273–74.  Malaysia AIDS Council chairperson, 
Datuk Paduka Marina Mahathir, noted that “we have an epidemic that is growing bigger 
and faster than ever before.” Martin Khor, Tackling AIDS with Cheap Generic Drugs, 
THIRD WORLD NETWORK, Dec. 6, 2004, http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/gtrends35.htm. 
 13 Singh & Crofts, supra note 10, at 273–74. 
 14 See infra Part I.A. 
 15 Christopher J. LaFleur, U.S. Ambassador to Malaysia, Luncheon Address at the 
Johor Corporation: An FTA for the Future (Apr. 27, 2006). 
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that of the TRIPs agreement in regard to pharmaceutical IP 
standards.  Part II.B, on the other hand, considers the benefits of 
adopting the stronger data exclusivity/linkage regime that is 
regularly advocated by the USTR and the pharmaceutical research 
and development industry.  Part III argues the FTA is likely to 
have a negative effect on access to pharmaceutical products in 
Malaysia.  Part III also addresses a number of key points in the 
U.S.-Malaysia FTA negotiations that can help balance the 
pharmaceutical industry’s requirement of investment incentives 
with the public’s need for affordably priced medicines.  Part IV 
concludes that the free-trade agreement will likely contain IP 
protections that are in excess of the level most appropriate for 
Malaysia’s social and economic needs. 
I. LEGAL AND SOCIAL CONTEXT FOR THE U.S.-MALAYSIA FTA 
A. International Trade Agreements and Intellectual Property Rights 
In 1994, with the creation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) established a comprehensive IP regime 
that imposed minimum IP requirements on all member states.16  
TRIPs required nations to employ strict IP protections where in 
many cases comparable domestic laws did not exist, or where they 
were not nearly as demanding as the provisions expounded in 
TRIPs.17  Among the most divisive issues, and one that has 
received a great deal of publicity, was the potential effect that 
TRIPs-level patent protection would have on pharmaceutical costs 
and availability.18  Under the new rules, companies were able to 
obtain the exclusive right to manufacture and sell the pioneer drugs 
 
 16 See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. XXIX, 
Annex 1C, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPs 
Agreement]. 
 17 Clark A.D. Wilson, The TRIPs Agreement: Is It Beneficial to the Developing World, 
or Simply a Tool Used To Protect Pharmaceutical Profits for Developed World 
Manufacturers?, 10 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 243, 245 (2005). 
 18 See Keith E. Maskus, Access to Essential Medicines and Affordable Drugs: Ensuring 
Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic Considerations, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 563, 
564 (2002). 
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that they developed anywhere in the world.19  Additionally, generic 
drug manufacturers were therefore prevented from entering the 
market and prices were able to remain artificially high.20  As a 
result, many WTO member countries, particularly those countries 
facing high prevalence of AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis, feared 
that their governments and patients would be unable to afford the 
drugs needed to combat pandemics and to meet other medicinal 
needs.21  Exorbitantly high drug prices in the developing world 
clearly illustrated that there were market failures in delivering 
affordable, life-saving medications.22 
In addition to the global TRIPs agreements conducted under 
the auspices of the WTO, countries are increasingly entering 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs).23  There is a 
trend in FTAs to establish IP protections that are in excess of those 
provided by the TRIPs agreement.24  These provisions are known 
as “TRIPs-plus” conditions.25  These agreements allow countries 
with greater bargaining power to negotiate trade policies without 
having to deal with organized opposition to their demands and 
without the same transparency that takes place with WTO 
negotiations.26  Terms that would have been, and often were,27 
rejected in the TRIPs negotiations often appear in bilateral trade 
agreements because the smaller nations feel that despite their 
concessions they are ultimately better off having some degree of 
 
 19 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 16, art. XXIX, Annex 1C, art. 27.1. 
 20 See Wilson, supra note 17, at 250. 
 21 See generally Maskus, supra note 18. 
 22 Id. 
 23 The Domino Effect of US FTAs: Public Health Groups, Members of Congress claim 
CAFTA will choke Access to Medicines, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY WATCH, Apr. 4, 2004, 
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=8&res=1024&print=0 [hereinafter The 
Domino Effect of US FTAs]. 
 24 See id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See Abbott, supra note 3, at 349; see generally DONALD G. RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 112–40 (M.E. Sharpe 2004). 
 27 See CARLOS MARÍA CORREA, SOUTH CENTRE, PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED FOR 
THE REGISTRATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLEMENTING THE STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT 53–54 (2002), available at http://www.southcentre.org/publications/ 
protection/protection.pdf. 
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free trade relations.28  The United States in particular has been 
aggressively pursuing such agreements and has concluded eighteen 
FTAs since 1985.29  Eleven other countries have held talks with the 
U.S. regarding the establishment of future trade agreements.30 
One of the U.S.’s key trade goals is to conclude a free trade 
agreement with Malaysia.31  While negotiations are conducted with 
little transparency,32 certain provisions of the future FTAs can be 
anticipated based on prior agreements that the USTR concluded.33  
The USTR uses these past FTAs as blueprints for future trade 
negotiation, so it is unlikely that the U.S. would fail to include 
similar provisions in new trade agreements.34  In addition to 
relying on the precedent of earlier FTAs, there are further 
indications that the U.S. would not deviate from its stringent IP 
provisions.35  In fact, it is likely for the U.S. and Malaysia to agree 
to IP provisions that are at least as strict as the prior FTAs because 
Malaysia’s plan for economic development specifically aims to 
place more emphasis on knowledge intensive sectors of the 
economy.36  In signing the Trade Investment Framework 
 
 28 Rahul Rajkumar, The Central American Free Trade Agreement: An End Run Around 
the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health, 15 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 433, 474 
(2005) (explaining that less developed nations make IP concessions in exchange for 
market access in the U.S.). 
 29 See Robert McMahon, The Rise in Bilateral Free Trade Agreements, COUNCIL ON 
FOREIGN RELATIONS, June 13, 2006, http://www.cfr.org/publication/10890/.  Of the 
eighteen negotiated agreements, four have not yet entered force and three are awaiting 
Congressional approval. Id.  See also Katherine A. Helm, Note, Outsourcing the Fire of 
Genius: The Effects of Patent Infringement Jurisprudence on Pharmaceutical Drug 
Development, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 153, 154 (2006) 
(enumerating regional and global trade agreements in which the U.S. has participated). 
 30 See McMahon, supra note 29. 
 31 See Press Release, Office of the USTR, United States Malaysia Announce Intention to 
Negotiate Free Trade Agreement (Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_ 
Library/Press_Releases/2006/March/United_States,_Malaysia_Announce_Intention_to_
Negotiate_Free_Trade_Agreement.html. 
 32 See Abbott, supra note 3, at 349. 
 33 See infra notes 34–40 and accompanying text. 
 34 See Office of the USTR—Trade Agreements Home, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_ 
Agreements/Section_Index.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2007). 
 35 See infra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
 36 See THE ECONOMIC PLANNING UNIT, PRIME MINISTERS DEPARTMENT, NINTH 
MALAYSIA PLAN 2006–2010, PUTRAJAYA (2006) at 268 [hereinafter MALAYSIA-
ECONOMIC PLAN], available at http://www.epu.jpm.my/rm9/html/english.htm (noting the 
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Agreement to initiate negotiations between the governments, both 
countries recognized that IP rights were going to be a major part of 
the trade agenda.37  The American Malaysian Chamber of 
Commerce similarly acknowledged that Malaysia would be 
adopting stronger IP protections as a result of the trade 
agreement.38  The USTR also made it clear that the nation believes 
that “economies demand pacts that . . . strengthen intellectual 
property rights,” and therefore the U.S. will make progress on 
these pressing IP rights issues through the upcoming U.S.-
Malaysia Free Trade Negotiations.39 
The USTR’s desire to strengthen IP laws in FTAs is illustrated 
in its 2006 “301 Report” on IP rights standards, wherein the USTR 
specifically expressed concern over the fact “that Malaysia has 
enacted neither protection against unfair commercial use of 
undisclosed test and other data submitted by pharmaceutical 
companies seeking marketing approval for their products, nor a 
coordinated mechanism between the health authorities and patent 
office to prevent the registration of unauthorized copies of patent-
infringing products.”40  In fact, these two IP protections, data 
exclusivity and patent linkage,41 have been included in every U.S. 
FTA to date.42  As FTAs require contentious and extensive 
 
recent increase in patent registration, and the policy reasons that favor further measures to 
continue increasing the role of intellectual property). 
 37 See Trade and Investment Framework Agreement Between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of Malaysia, U.S.-Malaysia, preamble, 
annex, May 10, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/TIFA/ 
asset_upload_file922_10023.pdf. 
 38 See AMCHAM Malaysia-US Chamber Public Submission on the US-Malaysia FTA, 
(May, 19 2006), available at http://www.amcham.com.my/Portal/DialoguePosition_ 
List.aspx?ctg=2041885b-0a81-4861-83ff-e505d43c10d7 (then click the link of the 
document’s title). 
 39 Ambassador Karan K. Bhatia, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, Remarks to the 
Asia-Pacific Council of the American Chambers of Commerce, Manila, The Philippines 
(Mar. 16, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Transcripts/ 
2006/March/asset_upload_file469_9143.pdf. 
 40 Office of the USTR, 2006 Special 301 Report—Watch List, http://www.ustr.gov/ 
assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/2006_Special_301_Review/asset_ 
upload_file190_9339.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2007). 
 41 See infra Parts I.C–D for a detailed treatment of what these IP rights require of the 
parties. 
 42 The U.S.-Malaysia Free Trade Agreement, PENANG ECONOMIC MONTHLY, May 
2006, at 8, available at http://www2.seri.com.my/Economic%20Briefing%20-%20Pg 
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negotiations, the USTR noted that while there may be a temptation 
for some parties “to lower their standards[,] [w]e won’t.”43  The 
U.S. has no intention of proposing anything less than its typical, 
stringent IP standards in its current negotiations with Malaysia. 
A number of common FTA provisions are relevant to 
pharmaceutical prices and delivery of medical treatment, including 
patent term extensions and expanded scope of patentable subject 
matter.44 For the purposes of this paper, however, the likely U.S.-
Malaysia FTA terms relating to data exclusivity and marketing 
approval will be the focus, as these terms were specifically noted 
by the USTR as deficiencies in Malaysia’s IP regime.45  These 
provisions delay generic drug manufacturers in getting approval to 
market their product, thus keeping the market free from 
competition—even when a patent term has expired.46  In addition, 
data exclusivity may impact the ability of a government to issue a 
compulsory license, which is considered a valuable mechanism for 
reducing drug prices.47 
B. Intellectual Property and the Pharmaceutical Industry 
The pharmaceutical industry’s progress depends on expensive 
research and development (R&D) costs.48  It maintains that 
effective IP protections are necessary to allow companies to recoup 
 
%20Econ%20Rept/EconBrief2006-05.pdf (stating that “[d]ata exclusivity is one of the 
provisions in all U.S. FTAs[].”). 
 43 Bhatia, supra note 39. 
 44 See Abbott, supra note 3, at 350. 
 45 See infra Parts I.C–D. 
 46 See infra Parts I.D–E for a detailed treatment of what these IP rights require of the 
parties. 
 47 See infra Parts II.A.3 and III.B.3 for a detailed treatment of how data 
exclusivity/patent linkage can impact a country’s ability to issue compulsory licenses. 
 48 COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, 
PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 19 (2006), available 
at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/report/en/ [hereinafter CIPR].  Allowing 
inventors to “appropriate the returns from their intellectual creations . . . [by granting] a 
time-limited monopoly” is known as the incentive function of patent protection. Id.  
Many argue that without this mechanism the collective society would see less innovation, 
and a temporary increase in price would outweigh the costs of that lack of innovation. Id. 
at 19–20.  See also id. at 19–21 (providing a brief discussion of the various other 
justifications for patent protection, including the transactional, disclosure, and signaling 
functions). 
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these expenses by excluding others from selling their medical 
inventions for a limited period of time.49  Studies estimate that the 
lengthy development process of a new drug costs from $110 to 
$880 million.50  With patent protection, and other forms of 
exclusivity, many countries hope to stimulate a homegrown market 
that has the capacity to conduct R&D and produce necessary 
pharmacological ingredients.51  Also, of special significance to 
developing countries, IP protections can enhance foreign direct 
investment in domestic markets.52 
Opponents of stringent IP regimes often argue that the increase 
in pharmaceutical costs that result from the granting of exclusivity 
outweigh the resulting increases in innovation and investment.53  
This is especially true for smaller markets or less technologically 
advanced countries where IP protections alone may do little to 
stimulate innovation.54  Those who are against increased patent 
protection also point out that the asserted costs of R&D may be 
exaggerated.55  Based on financial reports from 2004, “the seven 
largest US pharmaceutical companies spend, on average, only 
fourteen percent of their revenues on R&D while thirty-two 
percent is spent on marketing, advertising, and administration.”56  
The profits realized in the major markets alone more than recoup 
 
 49 See CIPR, supra note 48, at 32. 
 50 Valerie Junod, Drug Marketing Exclusivity Under United States and European 
Union Law, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 479, 481 (2004). See also Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The 
Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22(2) J. HEALTH 
ECONOMICS 151, 166 (2003) (estimating the cost of bringing a drug to market to be $403 
million). 
 51 See CIPR, supra note 48, at 32. 
 52 See FTA WATCH, OVERVIEW OF BILATERAL FREE TRADE AND INVESTMENT 
AGREEMENTS 8 (2006), http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/Overview.pdf.  “A number of 
[Asian governments]—such as Singapore, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand—are 
particularly trying to position themselves as hubs for the new trade and investment flows” 
through trade agreements. Id. 
 53 CIPR, supra note 48, at 25. 
 54 Id. 
 55 OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, OXFAM BRIEFING PAPER 86, PUBLIC HEALTH AT RISK: A US 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT COULD THREATEN ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN THAILAND 13 
(2006), http://www.oxfam.org/en/policy/briefingpapers/bp86_thailand_publichealth, 17–
19. 
 56 Id.  The report notes that the companies “report more in profits—18 percent of 
revenue—than they spend of R&D.” Id. (citations omitted). 
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the expenses associated with drug development.57  It is also argued 
that the “[d]eveloping countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America 
together account for only about 11 percent of the world 
pharmaceutical market,” and therefore the benefits to developed-
country pharmaceutical firms will be limited.58 
C. Public Health and the Pharmaceutical Industry in Malaysia 
The Malaysian health care system is heavily subsidized by the 
government, which assists in providing access to medicines for a 
largely impoverished population.59  However, “[t]he Ministry of 
Health estimates that . . . [public and private healthcare 
expenditures] would need to rise to about 7 [percent] of GDP by 
2020 to match developed country standards.”60  This increase will 
“put great strain on the government’s finances” and delays in 
receiving medical treatment may become “permanent feature[s] of 
the system.”61 
In 2004, Malaysia was one of the first countries to issue a 
compulsory license, a mechanism that allows a government to 
authorize generic drugs to enter the market despite the existence of 
a valid patent.62  According to the Health Ministry, the increased 
competition reduced the costs of treating patients with the patented 
brand name drugs from $261 to $197 per month.63  The decrease in 
cost of treatment using generic drugs was even more drastic, 
falling to $45 per month, which was a mere 17.4% of the costs 
based on the 2001 price of the equivalent patented products.64  
With the same level of resources dedicated to providing HIV 
treatment, the government could effectively treat six patients for 
 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See UNAIDS—Malaysia, supra note 8, at 8. 
 60 THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, INDUSTRY FORECAST: ASIA AND AUSTRALIA—
MALAYSIA 60 (2005) [hereinafter EMI-M]. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Khor, supra note 12. 
 63 Id.  See also THAILAND MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH, THAILAND HEALTH PROFILE 
430, http://www.moph.go.th/ops/health_48/CHAP10.PDF (last visited Mar. 18, 2007) 
(using the 90% reduction in the cost of a drug after the period of market exclusivity to 
illustrate the foreseeable cost escalation associated with adopting a stringent intellectual 
property regime). 
 64 Khor, supra note 12. 
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the price that it once cost to treat one person.65  With a tight 
healthcare budget, one which will likely need to expand in the 
coming years, the price of pharmaceuticals will be a key factor in 
medical treatment programs.66 
So while there is arguably potential for increased economic 
growth through participation in FTAs, there may also be severe 
social implications for developing countries as a result of the 
agreements’ IP provisions.67 This impact may be even more 
extreme in those cases where the FTA’s IP protections are 
substantially in excess of the TRIPs Agreement’s requirements.68 
Two key IP protections that affect the pharmaceutical market—
and that are priorities in the U.S.-Malaysia trade negotiations—will 
be discussed in turn.  Section I.D will discuss clinical test data 
protection, and Section I.E will discuss linkage requirements 
between drug registration and patent status. 
D. Clinical Test Data Protection in U.S. Trade Agreements 
1. What is Clinical Test Data? 
Before a pharmaceutical can be marketed for sale, the 
originator of the drug must demonstrate its “efficacy and safety for 
its intended therapeutic use.”69  This requires “extensive testing on 
animals and humans in pre-clinical and clinical trials, as well as 
toxicology, manufacturing feasibility and other scientific 
studies.”70  The final stages of development, when human testing is 
 
 65 Id. 
 66 See EMI-M, supra note 60, at 62.  This increase in spending is to account for an 
increase in the elderly population, a growing awareness of the role of healthcare services, 
continued urbanization, and increased incidents of cardiovascular disease. Id. 
 67 See generally MEDICAL SANS FRONTIERES, TOO LITTLE FOR TOO FEW: CHALLENGES 
FOR EFFECTIVE AND ACCESSIBLE ANTIRETROVIRAL THERAPY (2006), http://www.access 
med-msf.org/documents/MSF%20Toronto%20IAC.pdf [hereinafter MSF] (discussing 
accessibility in the context of HIV/AIDS treatment). 
 68 Id. 
 69 INT’L FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOC., ENCOURAGEMENT 
OF NEW CLINICAL DRUG DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY 2 (2000), 
http://www.ifpma.org/documents/NR83/DataExclusivity.pdf [hereinafter IFPMA]. 
 70 Id. 
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undergone, may require hundreds of human test subjects.71  While 
statistics as to the time and costs of this data gathering vary,72 it is 
clear that the process is “risky, laborious, and expensive.”73 
2. TRIPs Provisions on Clinical Test Data Protection 
The TRIPs Agreement’s provision on test data protection, 
Article 39 Paragraph 3, stipulates that “[m]embers, when requiring, 
as a condition of approving the marketing of pharmaceutical[s,] . . . 
the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of 
which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data 
against unfair commercial use.”74  Unfair commercial use includes 
(1) creating confusion with the activities or goods of a competitor, 
(2) falsely discrediting a competitor, or (3) misleading the public 
as to the nature and suitability of goods.75  The data protection 
afforded by the TRIPs Agreement differs from that of the U.S. 
FTAs in that TRIPs applies only to “unfair trade practices,” and 
that the member country must only prevent “disclosure.”76  The 
U.S. FTAs, on the other hand, provide “exclusive rights to the 
originator.”77  It is clear that during the negotiations of the TRIPs 
Agreement the U.S. government, as well as business communities 
from the U.S., Europe, and Japan, proposed that the Agreement 
provide for data exclusivity.78  However, these proposals were 
rejected.79  Countries favoring stronger data protections were 
 
 71 Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in 
International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPs 
Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 468 (2004). 
 72 See DiMasi et al., supra note 50, at 166; IFPMA, supra note 69, at 2 (estimating the 
cost to be around $500 million dollars). 
 73 Fellmeth, supra note 71, at 468. 
 74 TRIPs Agreement, supra note 16, art. XXIX, Annex 1C, art. 39.3. 
 75 See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 10, Mar. 20, 1883, 
as last revised July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 [hereinafter Paris 
Convention]. 
 76 MSF, supra note 67, at 3. 
 77 Id.  Under TRIPs, “WTO members do not have an obligation under Art. 39.3 to 
confer exclusive rights to test data . . . as pointed out by many experts.” Id. at 4 (citing 
Correa, supra note 27, at 44). 
 78 See Correa, supra note 27, at 53–55.  Unlike the proposals, which requested 
protection for any “commercial or competitive benefit,” the final draft of Article 39 only 
applied to “unfair commercial use.” Id. 
 79 See id. at 53–54. 
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unable to secure such terms in the multilateral negotiations, but 
they are now imposing these terms on nations through bilateral 
agreements.80 
3. FTAs Provisions on Test Data Protection 
While proponents of exclusivity for clinical test data were not 
entirely successful in the negotiations leading up to the TRIPs 
agreement, they have since fared much better in bilateral 
negotiations.81  Recent U.S. FTAs provide data exclusivity for a 
minimum of five years, and in some cases a three-year extension is 
available.82  For example, Article 16.8 of the U.S.-Singapore FTA, 
which contains a standard data exclusivity provision, reads: 
If a Party requires the submission of information 
concerning the safety and efficacy of a pharmaceutical or 
agricultural chemical product prior to permitting the 
marketing of such product, the Party shall not permit third 
parties not having the consent of the party providing the 
information to market the same or a similar product on the 
basis of the approval granted to the party submitting such 
information for a period of at least five years from the date 
of approval for a pharmaceutical product . . . .83 
In other words, when a generic manufacturer applies for 
marketing approval it cannot rely on the earlier test data that was 
submitted in the application of the original drug manufacturer’s 
application.  It is important to note that this provision is not part of 
a patent regime; instead it is a parallel form of IP protection that 
can exist even when a pharmaceutical product is not patented.84  
 
 80 See supra notes 23–30 and accompanying text. 
 81 See MSF, supra note 67, at 3. 
 82 See CARSTEN FINK & PATRICK REICHENMILLER, THE WORLD BANK GROUP, TRADE 
NOTE: TIGHTENING TRIPS: THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS OF RECENT US 
FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS 5 (2005) (providing a table cataloguing the IP provisions that 
have been included in eight recent FTAs). 
 83 Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, at 196, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/Final_Texts/Section_ 
Index.html  [hereinafter Singapore FTA]. 
 84 See MSF, supra note 67, at 2–3. 
Compared to more traditional intellectual property rights such as patents and 
copyrights, data exclusivity is very unusual since it does not require any 
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Therefore, even if the original drug is off-patent, a generic 
company will not be able to get marketing approval for its product 
unless it generates its own test data or waits until the exclusivity 
period runs.85  In addition to the impediments data exclusivity 
causes in allowing generic companies to enter the market, it also 
may prevent countries from using compulsory license grounds to 
exempt generic manufactures from patent protections in order to 
meet public health demands.86 
E. Patent-Registration Linkage Requirements in U.S. FTAs 
Patent-Registration Linkage (“linkage”) is “the practice of 
linking drug marketing approval to the patent status of the 
originator’s product and not allowing the grant of marketing 
approval to any third party prior to the expiration of the patent term 
unless by consent of the patent owner.”87 
Essentially, even if a generic company has prepared clinical 
test data (or is permitted to rely on the data of an earlier registrant) 
it still would not be able to register its product because the Drug 
Regulatory Agency (DRA) has determined that the originator’s 
patent is still in effect.  Linkage provisions thus pose two problems 
for the second applicant by (1) requiring the national regulatory 
 
inventive activity for it to be granted.  Data protection is instead only based on 
the fact that an investment has been made by the originator in carrying out the 
necessary tests to demonstrate . . . their new medicine[’s suitability for sale to 
the public]. 
Id. at 3. 
 85 See Carlos Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System 
for Access to Medicines, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 79, 92 (2004). 
 86 The TRIPs agreement provided member states with a number of mechanisms, called 
flexibilities, to insure that IP protection would not hinder a government from pursuing 
compelling state objectives, such as insuring the health of its public. See id. at 94.  U.S. 
FTAs include many of these flexibilities, though in many instances they vary as to what 
ground they will allow a country to make an exception to a patent right. See OXFAM, 
supra note 55, at 17–19.  An example of one such flexibility is compulsory licensing, 
whereby a government (or authorized third party) is allowed to produce a drug that is 
under patent, in order to deal with a public health crisis. Id.  However, it is unclear 
whether these emergency drugs would ever be able to reach the market in light of the data 
exclusivity provisions which would require the producer to generate its own clinical 
testing data before the drug regulatory agency would give the drug market approval. 
 87 CONSUMER PROJECT ON TECHNOLOGY, RESPONSE TO THE 2006 PHRMA “SPECIAL 
301” SUBMISSION FOR CHILE 4 (2006) [hereinafter CP-TECH]. 
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agency to make an assessment on the validity of the patent, and by 
(2) putting the burden on the applicant to prove that the 
originator’s patent is invalid.88  Such provisions therefore force the 
DRA to act as “patent police,”89 a role that is clearly beyond the 
expertise of a nation’s health authority.90 
The linkage terms in U.S. trade agreements are epitomized by 
the U.S.-Chile FTA, which provides that, in regard to 
pharmaceuticals that are under patent, the parties shall, in addition 
to preventing a grant of marketing approval, “make available to the 
patent owner the identity of any third party requesting marketing 
approval effective during the term of the patent.”91  When the 
patent holder is notified of such application, a protracted judicial or 
administrative battle may arise between the parties,92 thus further 
delaying the ability of the generics to enter the market. 
Whereas test data protection appeared in TRIPs, and is being 
extended by FTAs, the linkage requirements contained in U.S. 
FTAs are entirely unprecedented both in TRIPs and in the national 
legislation of many of the U.S.’s trading partners.93  Despite the 
establishment of minimum levels of global IP standards in the 
TRIPs Agreement, even stronger IP protections for 
pharmaceuticals are consistently included in subsequent FTAs that 
have been concluded.94  The positive and negative impacts of these 
expanded IP protections will vary depending on the market and 
legal regime in which they are applied.95 
 
 88 See CP-TECH, supra note 87, at 4. 
 89 See OXFAM, supra note 55, at 18. 
 90 Correa: Bilateralism, supra note 85, at 89. 
 91 Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, art. 17.10.2(b), Jan. 1, 2004, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Chile_FTA/Final_Texts/asset_up
load_file912_4011.pdf [hereinafter Chile FTA]. 
 92 See Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines: Analysis of 
WTO Action Regarding Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement 
and Public Health, 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 613, 709 (2004) (explaining that 
notifying the original applicant is likely to encourage patent owners to “make mischief” 
for the parties subsequently seeking market approval). 
 93 See Correa: Bilateralism, supra note 85, at 90–91. 
 94 See supra Parts I.A, I.D–E. 
 95 See infra Parts II–III. 
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II. THE EFFECTS OF THE FTA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
PROTECTIONS ON DRUG PRICES AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN MALAYSIA 
A.  The FTA’s Strict Intellectual Property Provisions May Make It 
More Difficult for Malaysians to Acquire Affordable 
Medications 
The U.S.-Malaysia FTA will entail certain increases in IP 
protection that will have three important ramifications for the costs 
of pharmaceuticals.  First, data exclusivity will allow patent 
owners to lengthen their period of monopoly beyond the twenty 
year grant, and will even allow a five-year market exclusivity 
period for pharmaceuticals that are not under a patent.96  Second, 
the linkage requirements will delay the entry of generic drugs into 
the market even after a patent term has run.97  Finally, the 
compulsory licensing mechanism, one that Malaysia has used 
before,98 may no longer be available.99  These impediments to 
increasing competition in the drug market will make many drugs 
more expensive, putting the most vulnerable Malaysians at risk.100  
The implications of each provision will be discussed in turn.  The 
potential impact of these provisions on compulsory licensing will 
be treated separately. 
1. Regulatory Data Protection Will Effectively Extend Periods 
of Exclusivity, and Allow Market Exclusivity for Non-
Patentable Chemical Entities 
In Malaysia, a pharmaceutical manufacturer must provide 
(1) Administrative Data and Product Information, (2) Quality Data, 
(3) Clinical Test Data, and (4) Non-Clinical Test Data in its 
registration application before its pioneer drug is approved for 
sale.101  A subsequent generic manufacturer, however, only needs 
to provide information on the first two categories, as well as a 
 
 96 See infra Part II.A.1. 
 97 See infra Part II.A.2. 
 98 See supra Part I.C. 
 99 See infra Part II.A.3. 
 100 See supra Part I.B. 
 101 See MINISTRY OF HEALTH—NATIONAL PHARMACEUTICAL CONTROL BUREAU, DRUG 
REGISTRATION GUIDANCE DOCUMENT (MALAYSIA) 35 (2004) [hereinafter DRGD]. 
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showing that its drug is therapeutically equivalent to the 
original.102  The subsequent generic manufacturer need not repeat 
the clinical testing, which will obviously arrive at the same results 
that the original (chemically identical) drug’s tests generated.103  
With a data exclusivity provision, such as those in U.S. FTAs, a 
generic manufacturer would have to independently generate all the 
test data in order to register its product.104  Because compiling this 
data is costly and expensive, it is unlikely that a generic 
manufacturer would be economically able to carry out these 
tests.105  It would have to wait for the exclusivity period to run, 
thus delaying the entry of its drug into the marketplace.106 
An originator drug that receives regulatory approval late in its 
patent term would have the data exclusivity period (at least five 
years) tacked on to however much time remains on its patent.107  
For instance, the Singapore FTA provides that, “[w]here a product 
is subject to a system of marketing approval . . . and is also subject 
to a patent in the territory of that Party, the Party shall not alter the 
terms of the [data exclusivity] protection . . . .”108  Therefore, the 
term of patent exclusivity may be exhausted, but nonetheless the 
clinical data still explicitly receives protection.109  This exclusivity 
is provided even if a product is unpatented, or where a patent was 
granted incorrectly.110 
 
 102 See id. at 25, 35. 
 103 See id. at 35. 
 104 See supra Part I.D.3. 
 105 See Rajkumar, supra note 28, at 465 (observing that “[l]ow-capitalized generic 
companies in small developing countries facing limited prospective revenues are 
generally not able to afford this expenditure”). 
 106 SISULE MUSUNGU & CECILIA OH, COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH 125 (2005) [hereinafter CIPRH REPORT]. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Singapore FTA, supra note 83, at 196–97. 
 109 Id. at art. 16.8(4)(a).  The Singapore FTA also has a requirement specifically 
included for pharmaceuticals which stipulates that patent terms should be extended in 
light of any “unreasonable curtailment of the patent term as a result of the marketing 
approval process[.]” Id.  See Susan Scafidi, The “Good Old Days” of TRIPs: The U.S. 
Trade Agenda and the Extension of Pharmaceutical Test Data Protection, 4 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 341, 349 (2004). 
 110 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Cost: An American Dilemma: 
The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 717, 728 (2005). 
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In addition to the standard five-year exclusivity term, some 
recent FTAs have also included a three-year extension of data 
protection for “new clinical information.”111  Unlike the typical 
five-year term, the further period of exclusivity is not limited to 
“new” originator drugs.112  This three-year protection of data even 
applies “to previously reviewed or approved pharmaceuticals.”113  
While the additional three-year term is not included in all FTAs, 
unlike the standard data exclusivity provision, its inclusion is 
supported by a number of key players in the U.S.-Malaysia FTA 
negotiations, including the American Malaysian Chamber of 
Commerce and the Pharmaceutical Association of Malaysia 
(PhAMA).114  The term that PhAMA proposes reads: 
Where the Authority grants registration and license for an 
application for a drug which includes an active ingredient 
that has been earlier approved in another application 
submitted to the Authority, based on confidential 
supporting information containing new clinical 
information . . . essential to the approval of the application, 
the Authority shall not, for a period of 3 years . . . register 
or grant license to another person in respect of that or a 
similar drug product on the basis of that earlier grant or the 
confidential supporting information submitted.115 
This provision requires DRAs to provide data exclusivity for 
information submitted as part of new drug applications, even for 
non-originator drugs that are not patentable, such as “new 
indications or other changes in a previously approved product that 
require conducting new clinical trials to win [DRA] approval.”116  
This protection can also be used to extend patent terms when an 
originator company delays until the end of its period of test data 
exclusivity, and then submits a subsequent application for drug 
 
 111 See Scafidi, supra note 109, at 350. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION OF MALAYSIA, DATA EXCLUSIVITY: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATIONS 1 (2006), http://www.phama.org.my 
[hereinafter DE-PhAMA]. 
 115 Id. at 3. 
 116 See Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 727. 
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registration.117  This tactic could be used, for example, if a 
company were to switch a medicine from prescription to over-the-
counter use.118  The company would provide the test data for a 
“new use” of the same drug, and then have a three year period of 
market exclusivity.119  When the initial patent or data exclusivity 
term (whichever was still in effect) came to an end, a generic 
company could sell the original drug, but it would be prohibited 
from selling the drug in the newly approved capacity.120  
Therefore, in the previous example, the generic company could not 
gain approval for the over-the-counter (OTC) indications.121  The 
generic company would only be able to continue selling its 
prescription variant, which may not be able to compete with the 
originator’s OTC product.122 
Both the three- and five-year periods of data exclusivity can 
prevent a generic company from getting its competing drugs to the 
market in a timely manner.123  Usually, the cost of re-conducting 
clinical trials is prohibitively expensive.124  However, even if a 
generic manufacturer was able to produce its own test data, clinical 
trials typically take six to eight years to complete.125  The 
originator would thus have complete control of the market during 
these periods, even without the protection from a validly granted 
patent. 
2. Linkage Requirements Will Delay Access to Affordable 
Medicines 
The practice of linking patent registration and DRA approval 
prevents a drug manufacturer from obtaining market approval for a 
 
 117 Id. at 728. 
 118 Id. at 728–29. Further, a company may also be eligible to get the same type of test 
data protection if it were to register the same drug for a new medicinal use. Id. at 729. 
 119 Id. at 728–29.  See, e.g., Press Release, Kline & Co., Impending Wave of Rx-to-OTC 
Switches Offers Significant Opportunities for Drug Companies (Aug. 15, 2002) 
(examining the strategic considerations of drug companies in timing their regulatory 
approval so as to prolong their market exclusivity). 
 120 See Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 729–30. 
 121 Id. at 729. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See notes 98–103 and accompanying text. 
 124 See Rajkumar, supra note 28, at 468. 
 125 See Baker, supra note 92, at 709. 
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drug while the original version of that drug is still under patent, 
unless “by consent or with the acquiescence of the patent 
owner.”126  Linkage requirements are prominent in U.S. trade 
agreements.127  The requirements prevent the timely entry of 
generic drugs into the market by forcing generic companies to wait 
until the patent period has expired before submitting an application 
to a DRA.128  Thus, subsequent applicants can no longer have their 
drugs approved during the pioneering product’s patent term so that 
upon expiration of the patent the drug can immediately enter the 
market.129  Thus, the length of time it takes to get marketing 
approval is basically an added period of market exclusivity for the 
patent holder.130  For example, in Malaysia the National 
Pharmaceutical Control Bureau typically takes twelve to eighteen 
months to complete the drug registration process.131  The effective 
length of a patent owner’s market exclusivity would typically be 
twenty-one to twenty-one and one half years, instead of the 
standard twenty-year patent term.132 
Furthermore, DRAs have no expertise in determining the 
validity of patents, and thus their role in determining drug safety 
and efficacy should not be concerned with patent law 
implications.133  The United States’ FTAs, which require 
regulatory agencies to make patent infringement decisions, 
“ignore[] that patents are private rights . . . [and] it is the patent 
owner who needs to act before the courts if he wants to interfere 
with the application procedures of a non licensed third party.”134  
Even the most advanced regulatory agencies like the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration concede that they are incapable of 
 
 126 See Singapore FTA, supra note 83, at 197. 
 127 See FINK & REICHENMILLER, supra note 82, at 5 (showing that the U.S. trade 
agreements with Singapore, Chile, Morocco, Australia, Bahrain, as well as CAFTA, all 
include linkage provisions). 
 128 Id. at 2. 
 129 See, e.g., Singapore FTA, supra note 83, at 196. 
 130 See supra Part I.E. 
 131 Ames Gross, Pharmaceuticals in Asia: Regulatory and Safety Updates (May 4, 2005) 
(presentation slides available at http://www.pacificbridgemedical.com/publications/ 
Asia_Drug_and_Safety_2005.pdf). 
 132 See id. 
 133 See Correa: Bilateralism, supra note 85, at 89. 
 134 Id. at 89–90. 
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assessing patent rights.135  Additionally, by forcing DRAs to 
address such concerns, “the process is kept in bureaucratic 
darkness, as opposed to a drug company suing for patent 
infringement through the courts.”136 
The U.S. FTAs include provisions that surpass the 
requirements of the TRIPs regime—a multilateral agreement that 
was controversial in its own right.  The linkage requirements are so 
strict that they are in excess of the United States’ own national 
regulatory requirements.137  As a result, linkage provisions in U.S. 
FTAs will delay market entry of drugs, and will place additional 
burdens on local DRAs.138 
3. Data Exclusivity Could Potentially Be an Obstacle to the 
Issuance of Compulsory Licenses 
Compulsory licensing is a mechanism used by governments to 
allow third parties to produce a product that is protected by a valid 
patent.139  If a patent owner will not license the rights to produce 
his protected invention, then the government can authorize a third-
party to manufacture the product.140  The TRIPs agreement, which 
all WTO members, including Malaysia, have signed, provides for 
compulsory licensing in Article 31.141  The Agreement requires 
that a third party must first make “efforts to obtain authorization 
from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and 
conditions” before a compulsory license is granted.142  If those 
 
 135 See UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT 
REFORM—MINORITY STAFF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS DIVISION, TRADE AGREEMENTS AND 
ACCESS TO MEDICATIONS UNDER THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, PREPARED FOR REP. HENRY 
A. WAXMAN (2005), http://democrats.reform.house.gov/Documents/20050609094902-
11945.pdf (quoting 59 Fed. Reg. §§ 50338, 50343 (Oct. 4, 1994) (explaining that “FDA 
does not have the expertise to review patent information.  The agency believes that its 
resources would be utilized in reviewing applications rather than reviewing patent 
claims.”)). 
 136 Kelly Hearn, Drug Deal, ALTERNET, May 25, 2005, http://www.alternet.org/ 
story/22081/. 
 137 See Correa: Bilateralism, supra note 85, at 93. 
 138 See id. 
 139 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 140 See id. 
 141 See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 19, art. XXIX, Annex 1C, art. 31. 
 142 Id. at art. 31(b). 
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efforts are not successful within a “reasonable period of time,” 
then a valid compulsory license may be issued in accordance with 
TRIPs.143 
The data exclusivity and registration linkage provisions in U.S. 
trade agreements may impact a government’s ability to issue a 
compulsory license.144  For instance, even if a license was granted, 
the two FTA provisions discussed above would prevent the second 
manufacturer from being able to get regulatory approval, and 
therefore the drug could not legally enter the market.145  The 
TRIPs-Plus terms of U.S. trade agreements “make illusory the 
granting of compulsory licenses and non-commercial government 
use, as prospective compulsory licensees are unlikely to have 
sufficient incentives to replicate test data, and governments cannot 
normally wait until a new set of test data has been developed.”146 
B. The  FTA’s IP Provisions Probably Will Not Have an Adverse 
Affect on Malaysians’ Access to Low-Cost Drugs 
The U.S.-Malaysia FTA’s TRIPs-plus provisions will increase 
available levels of IP protection.147  By creating strong IP rights, 
research-and-development-based industry investments will 
increase, and Malaysia will not be prevented from having a vibrant 
generic drug market.148  First, data exclusivity generally does not 
work to extend patent terms, and providing five-year market 
exclusivity periods for pharmaceuticals that are not under a patent 
is necessary to encourage companies to conduct research on new 
uses for previously patented drugs.149  Second, linkage 
 
 143 Id.  The requirement that a negotiation is attempted between the parties is waived in 
cases “of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency . . . [or i]n the 
case of public non-commercial use[.]” Id. 
 144 See Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual Property, Data Exclusivity, Innovation and 
Market Access, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO 
MEDICINES 127 (Pedro Roffe et al. eds., Earthscan 2006). 
 145 See id. 
 146 Correa: Bilateralism, supra note 85, at 92; see also Rajkumar, supra note 28, at 473 
(explaining that even if FTAs contain some of the “key loopholes” to patent rights 
contained in the TRIPs agreement, with the current “data exclusivity regime, none of 
these provisions matter anymore”). 
 147 See supra Part I.A. 
 148 See infra Parts II.B.1–3. 
 149 See infra Parts II.B.1. 
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requirements are already part of Malaysian regulatory practice.150  
Third, data exclusivity and linkage requirements will not hinder the 
compulsory licensing mechanism.151  The FTA’s provisions on 
drug regulatory data will not prevent access to low cost medicines, 
and are necessary to encourage investment and innovation.  The 
implications of each provision will be discussed in turn.152 
1. Data Exclusivity is Needed as an Incentive for Drug 
Innovators to Carry Out Expensive Clinical Tests on 
Off-Patent Drugs 
Malaysia hopes to use IP to promote innovation and growth in 
research and technology fields.153 Data exclusivity is viewed by the 
pharmaceutical industry as being critical to “enable Malaysia to 
have access to new therapies developed both locally and overseas 
that may otherwise not be available [, and] will create a favourable 
environment for biosciences investment . . . on par with other 
leading knowledge based countries[.]”154  If protection is not 
provided for clinical test data, subsequent manufacturers who rely 
on that data have a competitive advantage by not having to spend 
the time and money to produce it themselves.155  If the increase in 
competition from generics makes marketing of drugs unprofitable, 
then originator companies may not be willing to conduct the 
clinical trials at all, and the drug will never reach the market.156 In 
addition to the instrumental considerations, there is also an 
equitable argument—simply that later manufacturers are unfairly 
“benefiting from the ‘sweat of the brow’ of the initial 
registrant.”157  Malaysia can benefit from data exclusivity because 
it will create an overall stronger domestic IP framework.158  
 
 150 See infra Parts II.B.2. 
 151 See infra Parts II.B.3. 
 152 See infra Parts II.B.1–3. 
 153 See MALAYSIA-ECONOMIC PLAN, supra note 36, at 268. 
 154 DE-PhAMA, supra note 114, at 2. 
 155 See Fellmeth, supra note 71, at 468–69. 
 156 Id. at 469–70. 
 157 Id. at 469. 
 158 PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION OF MALAYSIA, DATA EXCLUSIVITY—A COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE IN THE BIOSCIENCES ENVIRONMENT 3, http://www.phama.org.my/pdf_ 
document/DATA%20EXCLUSIVITY.pdf [hereinafter PHAMA—COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE] 
(last visited Mar. 21, 2007). 
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Therefore, the country will be more effective in attracting foreign 
investment, and in developing a national drug research-and-
development-based industry.159 
As patent and data exclusivity periods typically run parallel to 
each other, it is only in the case of a drug taking over fifteen years 
from patent issuance to reaching the market that any extension in 
exclusivity would arise.160  However, a study of prescription drugs 
receiving marketing approval from 1998 to 2006 elucidates the 
importance of a non-patent exclusivity.161  Of 137 drugs approved 
during the relevant time period, “for twenty-three drugs out of this 
137 total, the period of marketing exclusivity extended past the 
expiry of the last patent.”162  If there is a long delay between the 
beginning of a patent term and the point at which the drug is ready 
for sale, the term may be so near expiration that a firm would 
choose not to incur the costs of bringing the drug to market.163  The 
five-year data exclusivity protection at least insures drug 
developers a short period in which they are essentially guaranteed 
to have a market free of competition.164 
Clinical test data protection in Malaysia is also valuable for 
chemical compounds that are not covered by a patent, as “more 
and more compounds which are not patent protected are being 
developed and . . . in these instances data exclusivity is the only 
available intellectual property protection.”165 For instance, 
had generic copies of TAXOL®, (paclitaxel), Bristol-
Myers Squibb’s anti-cancer drug, which did not have any 
patents on its active ingredient, been able to be approved 
immediately, [the originator] would not have had any 
incentive to incur the extensive costs (estimated at well in 
 
 159 Id. 
 160 See supra Part II.A.1. 
 161 See Junod, supra note 50, at 486–88.  The result of the study is available at 
http://www.pharmalaw.org/marketing%20exclusivity%20dates%20(12.3.04).doc (last 
visited Feb. 27, 2007). 
 162 Id. at 487. 
 163 See id. at 488. 
 164 See id. at 479. 
 165 PHAMA—COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE, supra note 158, at 3. 
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excess of $500 million) to develop, test and bring TAXOL 
to market.166 
If an originator company will immediately be faced with 
generic competition upon the initial marketing of its product, then 
the company may not even bother conducting research and testing 
on new uses of off-patent substances or new indications.167  But, 
with a guaranteed five-year period of marketing free from generic 
competition, pharmaceutical firms will continue to research new 
uses for products that are not protected by a patent.168  Data 
exclusivity is a strong protection, that prevents generic companies 
from competing in the market before a pioneering company has 
had an opportunity to recoup its R&D costs.169 
As the five-year term expires, firms can obtain an additional 
three years of exclusivity for a new indication of that same 
product, which can make it profitable to continue testing drugs 
even after they are no longer protected by a patent or the initial 
data exclusivity grant.170  One example of where this could be an 
effective mechanism for creating further R&D incentives is when a 
new indication of a drug is actually operating in a different field 
from the originator drug.171  For instance, a drug that originally 
was being used by dermatologists could effectively be prescribed 
for its use in a new capacity by cardiologists.172  To continue 
testing a drug after it has been marketed and sold, pharmaceutical 
 
 166 INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATIONS, 
ENCOURAGEMENT OF NEW CLINICAL DRUG DEVELOPMENT: THE ROLE OF DATA 
EXCLUSIVITY 7 (2000), http://www.ifpma.org/documents/NR643/DataExclusivity_2000.pdf. 
 167 Id. 
 168 See id. 
 169 See Junod, supra note 50, at 492–93 (assessing the difficulties associated with 
challenging clinical test data exclusivity). 
 170 But see Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 728–30 (arguing that the three year exclusivity 
“is likely to have little effect on incentives to conduct clinical trials of new uses of 
previously approved drugs”). 
 171 John A. Tessensohn, Reversal of Fortune—Pharmaceutical Experimental Use and 
Patent Infringement in Japan, 4 J. INT’L LEGAL STUD. 1, 60 n.217 (1998). 
 172 Id. But see id. (explaining that the “three-year exclusivity period may turn out to be 
illusory [because i]f there are generic products on the market approved for the pioneer 
use, despite the inability to disclose the newly protected use in labeling materials for 
generic copies, doctors may nonetheless engage in off-label use of the generic product for 
the protected use, thus destroying data exclusivity for the new use.”). 
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companies require the economic incentive of a three year market 
exclusivity extension.173 
2. Linkage Requirements Protect Patent Owners’ Investments, 
and Create a More Efficient Regulatory Framework 
By notifying patent owners when a generic company is making 
an application for approval, and requiring patent infringement 
issues to be resolved before marketing approval is granted, linkage 
requirements are beneficial to pioneer drug companies and the 
regulatory system.174  First, notice is given to the holder of the 
relevant patent, allowing him or her to “take the patent status into 
account before launching a development program or submitting an 
application, and [it allows companies to ensure] that the regulatory 
agencies have the necessary information to fairly access the 
patent.”175If there is insufficient communication between a DRA 
and a patenting agency, then there is the possibility that a product 
without authorization will enter the market.176  Second, by 
enabling a strong administrative environment, regulatory agencies 
can handle complex disputes that would otherwise be a drain on 
the judicial system.177 
If a generic product is granted regulatory approval, despite 
infringing on a valid patent, then the originator company will need 
to bring a judicial action to adjudicate the patent infringement 
when the infringement could have simply been prevented by the 
DRA. 
3. It is Unlikely that the FTA Provisions Will Prevent 
Malaysia from Using Compulsory Licenses to Address 
Public Health Concerns 
Amid concern that IP rights would stand in the way of 
providing life-saving medications to patients in the developing 
 
 173 See Junod, supra note 50, 496–97. 
 174 PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOCIATION OF MALAYSIA ET AL., PATENT LINKAGE 2 (2006), 
http://www.phama.org.my/pdf_document/PL_FTA_March2006.pdf [hereinafter PL-
PHAMA]. 
 175 Id. 
 176 See id. at 3. 
 177 See id. 
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world, in 2001 the WTO adopted the Doha Declaration on the 
TRIPs agreement and public health.178  The Declaration provided 
that countries have “the right to grant compulsory licenses and the 
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are 
granted.”179  The FTAs that the U.S. is pursuing will not interfere 
with the WTO’s Declaration.  The U.S. has made it clear through 
side letters that IP provisions in FTAs “do not affect a Party’s 
ability to take necessary measures to protect public health by 
promoting access to medicines for all[.]”180 
The proposition that data exclusivity would prevent a country 
from using a compulsory license was rejected in a letter from the 
U.S. Trade Representative to Congressman Sandy Levin 
(D-Mich.), which reiterated what was stated in the side letter on 
health to the U.S.-Morocco Agreement.  The follow up letter reads: 
If circumstances ever arise in which a drug is produced 
under a compulsory license, and it is necessary to approve 
that drug to protect public health or effectively utilize the 
TRIPs/public health solution, the data protection provision 
in the FTA would not stand in the way . . . [the side letter 
is] a significant part of the interpretive context for this 
agreement and is not merely rhetorical . . . [a]ccording to 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.181 
 
 178 See WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND 
PUBLIC HEALTH (2001), http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/ 
mindecl_trips_e.htm. 
 179 Id. 
 180 The Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement, 
Understanding Regarding Certain Public Health, Aug. 5, 2004, available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR_Final_Texts/ 
asset_upload_file697_3975.pdf [hereinafter CAFTA Understanding]; see also U.S.-
Morocco Free Trade Agreement, Side Letter on Public Health, June 15, 2004, available 
at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco_FTA/Final_Text/asset 
_upload_file258_3852.pdf (containing nearly identical language to CAFTA’s 
understanding). 
 181 Letter from the United States Trade Representative, General Counsel, John K. 
Veroneau  to Congressman Sandy Levin (July 19, 2004), available at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr627&dbname=108&; see Fink & 
Reichenmiller, supra note 82, at 3. 
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While not part of the main text, side letters are read as part of 
the agreement between the two parties.182  If there was a dispute 
settlement proceeding between the U.S. and Malaysia, it is likely 
that “any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between 
all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty” 
would be considered part of the treaty obligations.183  If the USTR 
does not include such an understanding in the current negotiations, 
it is also possible that the U.S.-Malaysia FTA could follow the 
model of the U.S.-Chile FTA which included a clause specifically 
dealing with public health; it provided that the parties have 
specified the terms of the agreements “[r]ecognizing the principles 
set out in the Doha Declaration on the TRIPs Agreement on Public 
Health.”184  The USTR has given its trade partners assurances that 
the need for strong IP protections will not interfere with the 
country’s ability to take measures necessary to protect public 
health.185 
III. BY ALLOWING PHARMACEUTICAL FIRMS TO EXTEND  
THEIR MARKET MONOPOLIES, THE U.S.-MALAYSIA  
FTA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROVISIONS DO NOT  
PROPERLY BALANCE THE  NEED TO ENCOURAGE  
INNOVATION WITH  PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS 
The U.S. is using bilateral trade negotiations to supplement the 
IP terms of the TRIPs agreement, particularly those relating to the 
protection of drug regulatory data.186  Implementing the data 
exclusivity provisions required by the FTAs is not taken lightly, as 
the U.S. and EU are using trade sanctions to retaliate against 
 
 182 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_ 
1969.pdf [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 183 Id. 
 184 Chile FTA, supra note 91, art. 17, preamble.  But see Australia Free Trade 
Agreement, U.S.-Australia, May 18, 2004 and Singapore FTA, supra note 83  (neither 
containing a side letter on public health or any explicit mention of the Doha Declaration 
on TRIPs and Public Health). 
 185 See CAFTA Understanding, supra note 180. 
 186 See supra Parts I.A, I.C.3, & II.A. 
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developing countries that fail to apply the stricter requirements.187  
The U.S.-Malaysia FTA will make it more difficult for Malaysians 
to acquire low costs drugs by (1) extending periods of patent 
market exclusivity for originator drug companies by delaying 
regulatory approval for subsequent generic manufactures, and 
(2) limiting the role that the Malaysian government can play in 
increasing competition through the use of compulsory licensing.188  
These heightened requirements will be aggressively enforced, and 
will provide governments with far less leeway than agreed to under 
the TRIPs agreement.189  For a country with pressing public health 
concerns,190 and a robust generic market, the impacts of these 
provisions will be more drastic in Malaysia than in FTAs with 
other states or regions.191 
The United States’ FTAs that have been negotiated in recent 
years are largely similar in the field of IP requirements, as prior 
agreements serve as a framework for subsequent negotiations.192  
Data exclusivity and patent linkage will certainly be part of the 
negotiations, and it is more than likely that they will ultimately 
appear in the concluded agreement.193  These predictable 
consequences of these FTA provisions will be discussed in 
Parts IV.A(1)–(2).  Then, in Section IV.B, the more speculative 
question of how they will impact Malaysia’s ability to use 
compulsory licensing will be assessed. 
 
 187 MEIR PEREZ PUGATCH, ICTSD-UNCTAD DIALOGUE ON ENSURING POLICY OPTIONS 
FOR AFFORDABLE ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
PHARMACEUTICAL DATA EXCLUSIVITY IN THE CONTEXT OF INNOVATION AND MARKET 
ACCESS 1 (2004), http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Pugatch_ 
Bellagio3.pdf (referring to the experiences of Israel, Turkey, and India, which have 
resulted in generic drugs manufactures being perceived as “national champions”). 
 188 See supra Parts II.1–3. 
 189 See supra Parts I.C.2–3, I.D. 
 190 See supra Part I.A. 
 191 Even with a strong generic market, Malaysian drug prices were already 20–76% 
higher than in India.  Douglas W. Bettcher, Derek Yach & G. Emmanueal Guindon, 
Global Trade and Health: Key Linkages and Future Challenges, 78 Bulletin of the World 
Health Organization 527 (2000) (citing A. Subramanian, Putting Some Numbers on the 
TRIPs Pharmaceutical Debate, 10 INT’L J. TECH. MGMT. 1, 1–17 (1994)). 
 192 See supra notes 32–39 and accompanying text. 
 193 See id. 
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A. Data Exclusivity 
In the United States, Congress introduced marketing data 
exclusivity with the primary objective of encouraging “the 
development and testing of unpatentable pharmaceuticals.”194  This 
policy is circumvented by two unfortunate facts of the regulatory 
data protection laws that are being exported in trade agreements.  
First, there is no requirement that medical advances to off-patent 
drugs be innovative.195  In fact, in the EU, the drug regulatory 
authority “has claimed that less than half of the 126 products 
approved . . . in its first five years ‘could be considered 
innovative.’”196  The only requirement for granting data exclusivity 
is that the product be a “new chemical entity,” a concept “with a 
broader meaning than required under the TRIPs Agreement”197 
which “not surprisingly . . . favours the interests of the U.S. 
pharmaceutical companies.”198 
Second, beyond the policy of increasing R&D expenditures 
relating to off-patent drugs, data exclusivity protections increase 
the length of patent terms in a significant number of drugs.199  An 
economic model used to determine the increase in drug prices in 
Peru as a result of the data exclusivity provision of a U.S. FTA 
estimates that seven years after the agreement came into effect, 
households would have to increase expenditures on medicines by 
$130.7 million “to maintain the same level of access to 
medicines.”200  In countries that have high proportions of their 
population in need of life saving medications, a delay in generic 
 
 194 See Allergan, Inc. v. Alcon Labs., 324 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing H.R. 
REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 29 (1984)). 
 195 See Junod, supra note 50. 
 196 See id. at 515. 
 197 Correa: Bilateralism, supra note 85, at 87. 
 198 Id. 
 199 Junod, supra note 50, at 487. 
 200 JUAN PICHIHUA SERNA, ICTSD, WHO, AND THE WORLD BANK INSTITUTE, 
DEVELOPING A METHODOLOGY TO ASSESS THE IMPACT OF TRIPS-PLUS PROVISIONS ON 
DRUG PRICES: POSSIBLE IMPACT OF US-PERU FTA ON ACCESS TO MEDICINES DUE TO 
DATA EXCLUSIVITY PROTECTION FOR DRUGS 6 (2006), http://www.iprsonline.org/uncta 
dictsd/dialogue/2006-07-31/9Peru%20Study-PichihuarevisedAug10.pdf.  It is important 
to note that the study only considers the drugs for which the data exclusivity runs 
consecutively with their patent term, so the exact costs are skewed from a typical real 
world market. Id. at 1. 
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market competition—whether a one-year (linkage) or five-year 
(data exclusivity) delay—could keep drugs beyond the budget 
constraints of many citizens or third party purchasers (e.g., the 
government).201  Plus, data exclusivity actually encourages drug 
companies to release improved variations of existing drugs slowly, 
so as to receive additional periods of exclusivity as its current term 
of exclusivity is near expiration.202 
The argument that it is feasible for a generic company to 
simply produce its own clinical data is economically203 and 
equitably204 untenable.  Even if it was financially possible for 
generic companies to reproduce clinical test data, as an ethical 
matter, requiring generic companies to reproduce clinical test data 
that is already in the archives of a drug regulatory authority is 
unacceptable.205  Requiring a company to conduct clinical trials on 
life threatening drugs, when a regulatory authority already has 
information demonstrating the drugs’ safety and efficacy, 
needlessly puts patients at risk.206  Conducting duplicative tests 
also needlessly causes the suffering and death of twelve million 
animals per year. 207 
The benefits of data exclusivity are questioned even in the most 
advanced knowledge-based markets of the U.S., EU, and Japan; 
these are the nations with the healthiest populations and largest 
pharmaceutical R&D industries.208  In light of Malaysia’s need to 
have drugs be affordable and available as soon as possible, instead 
of allowing regulatory data protection to extend beyond the end of 
 
 201 See, e.g., id. at 6. 
 202 See Eisenberg, supra note 110, at 729. 
 203 See Rajkumar, supra note 105 and accompanying text.  The economic and practical 
considerations were discussed separately in Part I.C.3. 
 204 See Fellmeth, supra note 71, at 474. 
 205 See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text; see also Implementation of U.S. 
Bilateral Free Trade Agreements with Chile and Singapore: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter 
Waxman Statement] (statement of Rep. Henry A. Waxman). 
 206 See Fellmeth, supra note 71, at 474. 
 207 Id. Twelve million animals are used each year to test drugs in the U.S. alone. Id. 
(internal citations omitted). 
 208 See generally, PUGATCH, supra note 187 (discussing, in parts 1–3, the competing 
policy considerations that the U.S. and EU DRAs weighed in deciding on appropriate 
regulatory schemes). 
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a patent term, the data exclusivity and patent exclusivity periods 
should expire concurrently.209  Alternatively, the data exclusivity 
could be administered with a sunset provision that would come 
into effect once the IP holder has received a predetermined 
percentage return on his or her investment.210  Nearly twenty 
percent of pharmaceuticals receive extended market monopoly 
periods from data exclusivity.211  A mechanism must be in place to 
limit any effective extensions to the previously established twenty-
year patent term.212 
B. Patent Linkage 
Patent linkage provisions are detrimental to generic markets for 
many of the same reasons as data exclusivity.213  However, while it 
was estimated that approximately one in five drugs will get their 
market monopoly extended with data exclusivity, linkage 
requirements will delay every single generic product’s entry into 
the market if the originator drug is under patent.214  The amount of 
time that linkage requirements add to the market exclusivity is 
however long it takes a country’s DRA to approve a drug, as the 
approval process will no longer begin during the originator drug’s 
patent term.  In Malaysia, this delay will be approximately twelve 
to eighteen months, giving all patented medicines terms of twenty-
one to twenty-one and a half years, instead of the twenty-year 
terms in accordance with the TRIPs Agreement.215  This 
calculation does not even account for the cases in which data 
exclusivity or other extensions that patent law may provide are 
present.216 
 
 209 See generally supra Part II.A.1. 
 210 See Health Registration Data Exclusivity, Biomedical Research, and Restrictions on 
the Introduction of Generic Drugs, Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human 
Services, Education, and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 105th 
Cong. (1997) (statement of James P. Love, Consumer Project on Technology), available 
at http://www.cptech.org/pharm/senhregd.html; Junod, supra note 50, at 515. 
 211 See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text. 
 212 See supra notes 165–174 and accompanying text. 
 213 Id. 
 214 See supra Part II.A(2). 
 215 Id. 
 216 See, e.g., FINK & REICHENMILLER, supra note 82, at 5 (noting that a number of FTAs 
grant exclusivity extensions for delays in the regulatory approval process). 
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Linkage requirements will have an impact on nearly all 
medications, and cumulatively will have an even more drastic 
effect than data exclusivity extensions.  These provisions are 
certainly TRIPs-Plus, and, in practice “patent-registration linkage 
goes beyond the standards applied in developed countries.”217  One 
commentator observes that U.S. FTA IP standards 
raise[] questions about how bilateral the U.S. bilateralism 
actually is . . . . [In fact,] the absolute and automatic patent-
registration linkage seems to go beyond U.S. law . . . .  By 
creating through bilateral negotiations standards of 
protection higher than those applied domestically, the 
powerful U.S. pharmaceutical industry may be able to force 
an amendment of U.S. domestic law in ways simpler and 
less costly that [sic] through lobbying in Congress.218 
Using FTAs to increase the level of IP protection in U.S. 
domestic law may not be effective unless Congress accedes to the 
goals of the USTR, and it is unlikely that Malaysia would attempt 
to force this issue by engaging in political criticism of it largest 
trading partner.219  The fact that the linkage requirements 
propounded by the USTR exceed developed-nation standards, 
however, should be alarming to developing countries asked to 
implement these standards. 
The disparity in bargaining power in bilateral agreements 
between the industrialized U.S. and developing countries is 
illustrated by one commentator who notes that “[w]hile the U.S. 
might have to yield to the EU, Japan or China on certain points in 
the WTO process, the absence of these players in bilateral trade 
negotiations means that the U.S. can extract whatever preferential 
terms of trade it wants.”220  Malaysia, on the other hand, may not 
have the option of ignoring or circumventing the FTA terms it 
 
 217 See Correa: Bilateralism supra note 85, at 90. 
 218 Id. at 93. 
 219 See Press Release, Office of the USTR, United States Malaysia Announce Intention 
to Negotiate Free Trade Agreement (Mar. 3, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
Document_Library/Press_Releases/2006/March/United_States,_Malaysia_Announce_Int
ention_to_Negotiate_Free_Trade_Agreement.html; see also Rajkumar, supra note 28, at 
450. 
 220 Rajkumar, supra note 28, at 450. 
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feels are not suitable for its legal and social context.221  The U.S. 
has not hesitated to coerce other nations into adopting heightened 
legal standards in trade agreements using economic sanctions.222  
The unyielding readiness of the U.S. to force compliance should be 
considered by nations, like Malaysia, who may be sacrificing much 
by implementing an inflexible IP regime.223 
Proponents of patent linkage argue that at one point Malaysia’s 
DRA was in practice using an unofficial linkage requirement to 
prevent generic application for approval.224  This informal practice 
that was developed has begun to wane, however, and now “there 
appears to be a shift in this practice and . . . generic applications 
have been approved despite valid existing patents.”225  
Unfortunately for generic competition in Malaysia, despite the 
trend in allowing generic drugs to be approved and thus ready for 
market access upon the expiration of a patent, the U.S. FTA will 
reinstate the abandoned linkage practice.226 
C. Compulsory Licensing 
The extension of exclusivity periods is not the only adverse 
effect that the data exclusivity and linkage requirements will 
 
 221 See id. (noting that only the most powerful countries are able to extract concessions 
from U.S. trade negotiators). 
 222 See id. at 450, 455, 470–71 (citing U.S. trade sanctions being used as a method of 
pushing for increased intellectual property protection in Nicaragua and Guatemala).  In 
Guatemala, the domestic legislature attempted to repeal its data exclusivity law and 
replace it with a new law that allowed for increased generic participation in the market. 
Id.  However, “the USTR has prevailed in its efforts to force Guatemala to repeal the . . . 
legislation.” Id.  The United States will undoubtedly demand a “strict interpretation of the 
data protection provisions.” Id. 
 223 See id. at 450–51 (describing the “unpreparedness” of developing countries during 
bilateral trade negotiations). 
 224 See PL-PHAMA, supra note 174, at 2; Kathleen Jaeger, President and CEO, Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association, Testimony Before the Interagency Trade Policy Staff 
Committee on the Proposed Free Trade Agreement with Malaysia: Generic 
Pharmaceutical Association (May 3, 2006), available at http://www.us-asean.org/US-
Malaysia%20FTA/Generic_Pharmaceutical_Association.pdf. 
 225 See PL-PHAMA, supra note 174, at 2 (noting that the linkage requirements were 
never codified anyway, so the drug control authority had no obligation to exercise patent 
linking practice). 
 226 See supra notes 214–215, 224–225 and accompanying text. 
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entail.227  As discussed in sections II.A.3 and II.B.3, there is 
speculation that compulsory licensing possibilities will be nullified 
by the strict exclusive rights granted for regulatory test data.  Some 
FTAs include provisions that specifically address this legal 
ambiguity, and others include side letters that provide the U.S.’s 
understandings of these provisions.228  Different FTAs have 
handled this issue in various ways, and as trade agreement 
discussions are conducted with little or no transparency,229 it is 
impossible to say which approach the U.S. will take this time.230  
The three specific possibilities that appear in previous FTAs are 
(1) providing a main text clause that requires interpretations that 
conform with the Doha Declaration on TRIPs and Public Health,231 
(2) giving assurances in side letters that the TRIPs-Plus obligations 
will not interfere with national compulsory licensing schemes,232 
and (3) not providing any clarification or interpretive guidance on 
the interaction of data exclusivity/linkage and compulsory 
licensing.233 
If there is a clause in the main text of the agreement referring 
to the Doha Declaration, which made it clear that compulsory 
licensing was a key attribute for developing countries to use in 
fighting health crises, then presumably the TRIPs-Plus obligations 
would not be permitted to interfere with compulsory licensing.234  
The ambiguities would likely be resolved in the favor of the 
developing country if the issue were brought before an ad-hoc 
dispute settlement body.235 
If, however, the public health concerns were addressed in a 
separate side letter, the interpretive value would not be as clear.  
 
 227 See supra Parts II.A.3 & II.B.3. 
 228 See infra Parts III.A.3 & III.B.3. 
 229 See The Domino Effect of US FTAs, supra note 23 and accompanying text; Abbot, 
supra note 3. 
 230 Abbott, supra note 3. 
 231 See Chile FTA, supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
 232 See supra Part III.B.3. 
 233 See supra notes 139–146 and accompanying text. 
 234 See World Trade Organization, Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, 
WT/L/540 and Corr. 1 (2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ 
trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm. 
 235 See infra notes 236–241 and accompanying text (discussing the questionable value 
of side letters when compared to main text terms within trade agreements). 
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First, side letters may be deficient because of the restrictive way 
that they are drafted.236  In the CAFTA side letter, for example, the 
“USTR rewrote . . . the Doha Declaration to reflect a U.S.-
preferred outcome to WTO negotiations,” and does not fairly 
reflect the language of the Declaration itself.237  The language used 
attempted to impose a “scope-of-diseases” limitation on when 
compulsory licenses could permissibly be used by a 
government.238  Second, while the Vienna Convention requires that 
side letters be considered as part of the FTA’s overall context, the 
side letters may also be seen as “merely signal[ing] the signing 
governments’ belief that the intellectual property rules of the FTAs 
will not interfere with the protection of public health.”239  Further, 
the office of the USTR has informed World Bank staff that in its 
view the understandings do not create any “exemption that would 
allow parties to the FTAs to ignore obligations in the agreements’ 
intellectual property chapters.”240  If side letters are understood as 
no more than a prediction by the U.S. government, then they 
provide no guarantees as to the true workability of the compulsory 
licensing mechanism.241 
Another potential option is that the U.S.-Malaysia FTA could 
simply not address the negative implications that data 
exclusivity/patent linkage could have on compulsory licensing.242  
If a dispute arose between the parties to the agreement, there would 
 
 236 See Abbott, supra note 3, at 352. 
 237 Id. at 352–53. 
 238 Id. Furthermore, the side letter qualifies the terms of the Declaration by requiring that 
any use of a compulsory license must be “necessary.” See CAFTA Understanding, supra 
note 180; CARLOS CORREA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW AND DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE, 
PROVISIONS IN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS THAT MAY AFFECT ACCESS TO MEDICINES IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 8 (2006), available at http://www.idcid.org.br/wtoandbeyond/ 
Provisions%20in%20Free%20Trade%20Agreements%20that%20May%20Affect%20 
Access%20to%20Medicines%20in%20Developing%20Countries%20-%20Carlos%20 
Correa.doc. 
 239 FINK & REICHENMILLER, supra note 82, at 3 (emphasis added). 
 240 Id. at 3, 10. 
 241 See supra notes 236–239 and accompanying text.  For example, the U.S.-Australia 
trade agreement does not mention the Doha Declaration.  See Free Trade Agreement, 
May 18, 2004, U.S.-Austl., ch. 11, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_ 
Agreements/Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/ asset_upload_file148_5168.pdf. 
 242 C.f. supra notes 236–239 and accompanying text (describing the added assurances 
that references to the Doha Declaration in the main text and side letters provide). 
GALANTUCCI_FINAL_050807 5/8/2007  1:06:06 PM 
1120 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. Vol. 17:1083 
be no assurances that Malaysia was acting within its sovereign 
rights by issuing a license.243 
The FTA provisions on compulsory licensing are particularly 
important to Malaysia.  Compulsory licenses have rarely been 
issued to manufacture generic drugs, but Malaysia has shown that 
it is willing to do so.244  Even when licenses have not been used, a 
government threatening to introduce new competition has proved 
to be a powerful bargaining chip to force manufacturers to produce 
necessary quantities of a drug at an affordable price.245  Malaysia, 
both because of its willingness to be flexible with patent rights, and 
because of its public heath situation, must have the legal means to 
issue compulsory licenses.246  Whichever provision the FTA 
includes on data exclusivity and patent linkage, Malaysia’s trade 
negotiators should insist on an understanding that allows the 
government to use TRIPs-type flexibilities.247  Better yet, the FTA 
should indicate what additional steps a government must take to 
issue a license in light of the two stipulations on clinical test data 
exclusivity.248 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The multilateral TRIPs negotiations were concluded with a 
number of compromises between the developed and developing 
world, and ultimately “represent[ed] a victory of collective 
bargaining power” for developing countries.249  Bilateral 
negotiations, conversely, allow a dominant country to impose its 
 
 243 See id. 
 244 See supra Part II.A. 
 245 See William Onzivu, Globalism, Regionalism, or Both: Health Policy and Regional 
Economic Integration in Developing Countries, an Evolution of a Legal Regime?, 
15 MINN. J. INT’L L. 111, 140 n.175 (2006) (giving a brief synopsis of the laws in South 
Africa and Brazil that create a framework wherein a government could issue a 
compulsory license) (citations omitted). 
 246 See generally supra Parts I.A, II.A.3. 
 247 See generally supra Parts I.A, II.A.3. 
 248 See generally Robert Weissman, Data Protection: Options for Implementation, in 
NEGOTIATING HEALTH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 151–78 
(Pedro Roffe et al. eds., Earthscan 2006) (describing the different approaches that 
countries may take in implementing new data exclusivity protections). 
 249 Scafidi, supra note 109, at 342. 
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desired IP regime on a developing nation, instead of forcing parties 
to reach an international consensus before determining appropriate 
standards for the global economy .250  By using FTAs the U.S. “is 
engaged in a systematic effort to increase international intellectual 
property protection, one country at a time.”251 
As in all IP regimes, a country’s “regulatory system of 
marketing/data exclusivity should be . . . tailored to balance the 
conflicting interests it is supposed to take into account.”252  When 
developed countries like the United States try to strike this balance, 
they will inevitably have different priorities and concerns than a 
developing country.253  On the other hand, there is a need to have 
some minimum level of IP rights in order to attract foreign 
investment and to develop homegrown research and development.  
The TRIPs Agreement mandated that patents must carry twenty-
year terms, and also afforded developing countries a number of 
mechanisms to maintain flexibility with IP protections.254  Free 
trade agreements are increasing the obligations of developing 
nations by effectively extending patent terms, and perhaps even 
eliminating compulsory licensing.255 
After including U.S.-style drug regulation in FTAs with Chile 
and Singapore, even Congressman Henry A. Waxman (D-Cal.), 
who sponsored the U.S. version of the legislation, expressed 
concern that such a regulatory regime would be inappropriate in 
developing countries.256  In a statement to the House Ways and 
Mean Committee, he observed that: 
 
 250 See id. at 343–44. 
 251 Id. at 343. 
 252 Junod, supra note 50, at 481. 
 253 See Jacqueline Ann Surin, Local drug makers may lose out under US FTA, THE 
EDGE DAILY, July 17, 2006, available at http://www.theedgedaily.com/cms/content.jsp? 
id=com.tms.cms.article.Article_772db6e3-cb73c03a-110b6400-7d0bac10.  Local generic 
manufacturers, private and public, will be adversely affected by the new IP protections. 
Id.  For example, “‘[t]he World Health Organisation predicted that Colombia’s generic 
industry would lose up to 71% of its market share due to its US FTA, while one-third of 
Australia’s generic companies had to close or merge when data exclusivity alone was 
introduced in Australia.’” Id. (emphasis added); see also Rupa Damodaran, Malaysian 
manufacturers wary of US move on patents, BUSINESS TIMES, MALAYSIA, Aug. 22, 2006. 
 254 See supra Part I.C.2. 
 255 See supra Parts I.A, II.A.3. 
 256 Waxman Statement, supra note 205. 
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devastating epidemics in the developing world, including 
AIDS, TB, and malaria are killing millions of people and 
crippling whole societies. Even in middle-income 
countries, leading killers like heart disease, diabetes, cancer 
and other conditions are going untreated because essential 
medications are unaffordable in these countries, costing 
many times the average citizen’s annual income . . . .  [T]o 
impose [the U.S. intellectual property] system on a country 
without a safety net, depriving millions of people of life-
saving drugs, is irresponsible and even unethical.257 
Malaysia is transitioning into a knowledge-based economy, and 
wants to encourage research and development-based investment.  
However, the level of IP protection that will be imposed by its 
FTA with the U.S. will go beyond what is necessary to accomplish 
these goals.258  As patent terms for pharmaceutical products will 
effectively be increased from twenty years to twenty-one to 
twenty-five years, generic drugs will be delayed in entering the 
market, and prices will rise accordingly.259  If, after the adoption of 
the FTA, market-determined prices of medicines become too 
expensive for Malaysian consumers, the government may no 
longer have the ability to issue a compulsory license.260 
During the continuing trade discussions, even if Malaysia’s 
negotiators accept longer exclusivity periods for originator drug 
companies, the price increases can be managed so long as a clause 
insuring the availability of compulsory licensing is insisted 
upon.261  If compulsory licensing is in effect eliminated from the 
 
 257 Id. 
 258 See Surin, supra note 253 (noting that “‘Malaysian pharmaceutical manufacturers . . . 
are still decades away from inventing new medicines,’” and “98% of patents granted in 
Malaysia are to foreigners.”); Weissman, supra note 248, at 165. 
 259 See supra Part I.B. 
 260 See supra Parts I.C, II.A. 
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government’s arsenal of competition-increasing legal mechanisms, 
drug prices could dangerously escalate with no viable means of 
regulation.262  As the U.S. is “Malaysia’s largest trading partner 
and [its] largest foreign investor,”263 the harsh reality of the 
bilateral negotiation forum is that the U.S.’s bargaining power may 
prevent Malaysia from extracting even those minimal concessions 
that are necessary for it to deal with public health crises. 
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